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THE N01rION OF COMPLEXITY 





The purpose of this essay is to develop the notion '. of 
complexit? as a conceptual tool for a comparative analysis 
of the proponents and critics of Interest-Group Pluralismo 
The primary question I will attempt to answer concerns the 
'Nays in which these proponents and critics differ in res-
pect to their :conceptions of (a) analytical complexity, 
(b) descriptive complexity and, (9) prescriptiv~ complexity. 
Important to note at the outset of this essay are its 
limitations. First, it is not possible to cover all of the 
proponBnts and critics of Interest-Group Pluralism in this 
essay, for the amount of literature is massive. What I will 
attempt to cover is a sampling of' those so-called ''plural~ . 
ists .. and "anti-pluralists" who concern themselves with urban 
and community politicso 
Second, the terms "pluralist" and .. anti-pluralist" used 
to describe two categories of po).itical analysis have some 
difficulties~ The terms are primirily used in this essay for 
the sake of clarity. 
Third, although pluralists differ from anti-pluralists 
in many ways, I have chosen to discuss these differences. in 
2 
terms of complexity. I do not intend to imply that the use 
of the notion of complexity is the only way, or even the best 
way, to differentiate these two c~tegories of pdlitical 
analysis. 
Fourth, because the emphasis of this essay is on the 
differentiation between pluralists and anti-pluralists, it is 
not possible to cover all the salient issues concerning the 
notion of complexity. I will attempt to focus on those aspects 
of complexity which I believe are the most relevant to the 
pluralist/anti-pluralist controversyo 
For the purposes· of this essay, the term O complexl ty•• 
will be used to describe the extent to which the following 
f t . . d 1 ac ors are maximize: 
(1) the number of unit s , (size) 
(2) the differeritiation of t hese units, (differentiation) 
(3) the incidence of relational interdependencies among 
these units , (interdependence) 
(a) 
( b) 
the overlapping of units performing different 
functions 
the .incidence of functional redundancy.among 
these units 
(4) the variability of the above factors over time. t 
(variability) 
.. ri~--,4(_ _ 
~ 
The term "simplicity" will be used to describe the extent to 
which ~he above factors are minimizedo 
The operationalization of ·the notion of complexity is 
3 
somewhat problematic in that the factors of complexity are 
non-additiveo McFarland contends: 
If one system has fewer components, but greater in-
terdependence and variability (i.e., chan~s in degree 
of defferentia tion over time), than another,· it vm uld 
be difficult or impossible to determine which system is 
more complex, unless the system with fewer v~riables is 
identical to a subsystem of a second system.~ 
McFarland goes on to assert that in order to compare systems 
on the basis of complexity, we must demonstrate that "one 
system exhibits a greater magnitude than the other on all 
three dimensions of complexity.,.3 
LaPorte argues (and I agree) that McFarland is overly 
impressed with the difficulties in comparing the degree of 
complexity in different systems. Althouigh the non-additive 
qual_i ty of complexity does make comparisons methodologically 
tricky. it shoula not present an insurmountable problem in 
operationalizing the notion of complexity to differentiate 
1·t· 1 1 . '+ po~i ica ana yses. 
Important to note is that the notions of complexity and 
simplicity are abstractions and should be viewed as opposite 
ends on a theoretical continuum. 
The heuristic advantage in distinguishing between complex-
ity and simplicity is th~ explication of the conceptual pos-
sibility of either case; it is not to quantify the relative 
degree of complexity in order to compare it with another struc-, 
ture. 
Thi~ essay will be divided into four sections to _discuss 
the relevancy of four distinct categories of complexity/ 
4 
simplicity to the political analyses of pluralists and anti-
pluralists. 
. 5 
These four categories are as follows; 
(1) structures of political interaction (structural com-
plexity) 
(2) variables or concepts used in political analysis 
(analytic complexity) 
(3) description of structures of interaction (descrip-
tive complexity) 
(4) ~prescriptions for structures of interaction {pre-
scriptive complexity) 
While others have used slightly different categories to anal-
ise complexity, I believe that these categories make for the 
most useful distinction between pluralists and anti-plural-
ists. 
In the first section on structural complexity, I will 
analyse the theoretical possibility of complexity in concrete 
structures of interaction~ While this theoretical analysis 
of structural complexity is abstract , the jmportance of it is 
to conceptualize the constituent factors of complexity/simpli- _ 
cityo These factors will be utilized in the discussions of · 
the other three asp~cts of complexity . 
In the second section, the discussion on analytic com-
plexity will ~eal with two aspects of complexity in politi-
cal analyses: (1) the number and differentiation of variables 
or concepts used in political analyses, and (2) the complex-
ity/simplicity of the structure of analytice frameworks. 
., -
5 
The first aspect will be used to describe the methodological 
comp1exity of a particular analysis: the second, the complex-
ity of structures of analytical frameworks of a 'particular 
category of analysis. In this context, pluralists and anti--
pluralists will be examined both in terms of particular anal~ 
yses and of -the structure of pluralist and anti-pluralist an--
alytical frameworks. 
In the third section, the distinction will be made be-
tween th~ descriptions of the political process as seen in 
the works of pluralists and anti-pluralists. It will be use-
ful to distinguish between what I have termed "descriptive 
pluralists .. and "descriptive anti-pluralis.ts 0 ~ The ·former 
describes the political process as being relatively complex; 
the latter, as being relatively simplec 
In the fourth section, the distinction between °descrip-
tive" and "prescriptive" pluralists and anti-pluralists will 
be clarified. Here again, prescriptive pluralist prescribes 
complexity for the political process; the prescr.:j.,pt_ive 
anti-pluralist prescribes simplicityo Whil~ it may be some-
times difficult to distinguish the difference between the 
normative judgments and the descriptions of the political 
process made by particular political an~lists, I will ~ttempt 
to make this d~fferentiation as clear as possible. 
It is important to note that I do not intend to make any 
overt judgments on the verity of the pluralist or anti-plural-
ists arguments; rather, I intend to demonstrate how trade-offs 
.. ·; . ' 
6,· 
are made when the political scientist embarks on
 an a.Da.1-
ysis of the political process. While this argumen
t will be 
developed thr~ughout this essayt it is important t
o note that 
the method of approaching concr~te structures of in
teraction 
affects the complexity/simplicity of description o
f these 
structure so 
'-· . - '"{ 
it ' 
'i.'b.:: -ce~·;r: "structur~ l cor;;:pL:.:xity" :is used h;.:1re to sign.l.fy the ex:0r: t 
..... !- d. . ·"~t. . rna.r- ,-,if os·,_1.::i. • in C!J'.-"r-r:.:.~ .,-,: 1 rn.--:-1, ...... ~<:.:.· a~-. ... ,1,. _._, , -- ,.._ ,.;_J. __ '-• V -....1 -- ...._._ V~ -t,J 
of :int.3:rac tion. The first factor, the size of che structure, is •ieter-
.l. · 
mined by tha number of individuals :performing roles. However •. the m1Jn':Jer 
of people performing roles is only one aspect of structural complexity. In 
the case of a large typing pool, for example> :where all the indi vidi.:.als 
are typing form letters, we would not consider this structuxe complex, for 
they are all pert·orming the sarae role. 
STRUCTURAL con?LEXITY .. -DI??EREl:TI .t .. TION 
Tha di:£'erentiatlon of roles withir: the structure is tha secon.d f3.c-
l:-o:·: of struchtral complexlty. Ths maxi mi z;ation of the diff:~renti.s:t.bn Ln-
r,li·,~r. t-'1 mul_...,,...-i1c ·i't~· o=· ii·f·-f'c,-r.:.-.,-,.:. -"",u,·--ti"·Jnal ""Ole-=:. · ::;i,-.·?.i·v1'..l..1·,::,c, ,..:,...:..C J:-'- --- -l,~ e .i. v-j! .... ,_ .} .,. l . . .J...;.,_c;,. .. 1., .... d::., ' J... .._.,. c,.,._.(.,_ . I., ...,.::,, ~,., . •J 
performed within ~ the structure. This is not to say --~hat the 
w:1y- in r,rhich an ind.i vidual pr:::rfo.rms a rols doe.3 not alter the role i tsc::lf ; · 
rathar, the individual · acts within the col\fines of the roL3. The const?-~ints 
of that role become more of a factor as the role becomes more formalized 
r,,ri thin ai1 in_;::.ti tutional structure. 
In informal structures, we may say that the prescribed activitie;s 
of the roles are largely determined by the individual. In forrr.al stri;.c-
tures, on the other hand. the activities of the role are largely prescrn:ed 
by the institution. That institutional structures have both forJ:.al ar..<-! 
infoYmal dnractc;ristics D.aJces the importance ·of the prescribed functio~s 
. '
by the :p:!:'escrib::d activities of' th~ :role a.nd by tha l.n:li villual :p·2r:::·or::ling 
A co.:n.r;ion argt:.ment, - b I , ._, j 4""1 ~..-l • ., "t .,,..._ ! ,r,. ,.., ma.de . y -r,n:eo:r·isT .. s a.;.~a.J...Y ;::>J..~16 ~ne notion of cc~-
plexity, states that the· maximization of the di:fferen:tiation of roles 
denotes the minimization of the fu..'1ctional redundancy of these rol8s. 
However, this argument appears to be fallacious, for t-;..ro reasons. 7he 
first reason i3 derived from the asstuaption stated above that the indi-:--
viduaJ. perfo11ming a role alters the function of that role~ In-this way, 
tha prescribed function of the role, itself,· is t:1e same wheri it is a.s-
cri·bed to two ;individuals, but the ·way i:::1 which the f, .. rriction is· 'cir::-ied 
out may be different. 
The second reason is derived from the conTnm1 u2a.ge of t:--,.e safc~ty 
If the prescribed function o.::' a role is considered iL:por-
t:mt 1 it is :111lE:ely that o:1e- person will ·be en:.ru::;ted. with tha cofiplete 
re:..,ponsi bili ty of that functional. role. H1xarr .. ples of these safety r:.ech-
~-(11 ::~ 0 s are ma.nifold. To use a mechanistic raferencet additional fea-
tu:;1:;s of a highly complex mac:1ine a:ce often used to ensure that t;i,e p:ri--
m2.ry function of that machb.e is performed. These· 0 sa .. :ety • • 0 mecnanisms 
ar2 utilized when a pa....--t o:: the machine breaks c .. oFn .. In an exa;nple 
:found in nature, we see that when one s~pecies becomes extinct, a.:.'1otha:r 
species tha ... 1-<as its place in the food. chain. 
While I coulJ. cartainly be wrong in my observation, it appears that 
.theorists andysing the notion of COi?\plexity hava inco:;..."'Tectly owitted the 
concept of redu.1:::iancy in their defini ticus of com_plexi ty. Thdir defi:-ri-
9 
tiu:is of com;,L ~:-.:i t y irr:.Jly r igidity 2 .. nd fragility ~-r~i.ic:~ m?,.y not pro2erly 
The third factor of' structural ··ccrnple;x:ity··involves the incide.nce · o:: 
relational interdependencies among actors performing rol~s. 3y the terr.1 
uinterdependence;' the essential implication to be ma.de concerns the m.u-
t·1al exercise of powe:r amori.g ir:dividuals performing roles within the or-
ganized st~ucture. 
The term "power" is used to describe the ability of one individual 
or group to overc,::rnre the resista:.'1ce of another indi vid'..12J. o:r group. Iha 
amount of power ascribed to an individual or group is relative to that 
held ·by ·other indi vicluals or groups, .for tie active utilization of poiier 
i:1Volves ::;one kind of relationship between individuals or groups . 3 
Since t~:.s conc8ptim1 of power exists only ir. re::.s.:tionshi:ps "2etween 
:iudi"1id.ua1s o; gr,:rn;1s, -r..r .. ,ere ar:e three necessary condi tion3 existent in 
First , there must be an ir ..:i.ti2,.l ccin:flict of in-
te:rest or value. ~et:.-reen bro or more perso:rrs or groups . I: there were no 
there would be no resista..r-1ce to be overcor:1e, an,i there would l.'t 
:Go ne0d for tha utilization of power in that relationship. Secondt the 
power relatio:c.ship can o!'lly exist is at least one of the parties . posses~3es 
];Ower asset3-.- --tr1a ability to invoke Ganctions, to prm::ise rewards, and 
to suppress or change opinions . In any power rela-tio11ship, ar1y one , or a 
coi-ri"bination o:f thsGe abilities , are utilized. Third, the power relation-




Coerci v2 f-O'dBr involves th3-
th::-citaning or tha UGe of violent intervsntion with the actual use of 
phJsical force. Al though th~ threatening of the use of force is analy-
tically distinct from its actual usage, both are included in this type 
of po-..·1er relationship. :foen viole":.1ce Ls threatened, the individual sub ... 
·jected to this type of power has the choice of complia.:n.ce or non~complia.nce 
:-Tith t:1e demands of the individual making the threat. However, 1-Then _force 




Utilit.3.ria.n :power is activated when assets1 such as 
fl . • ·-economic._· 
;)oss2:3sions, technical and a.dninistratl Ve ca:pabi.li ties, r:1a.t,._powe:r, 
a.L';2; utilized to get1erate suF;>vsrt ot a pariicula:r line of actiori. 
e+c ir y ., . 
Tl1is 
of pm-ier ::.nvol ves rewD.rding or the l)er.allzir:g of tha su~jected 
i:-div:'...dua1. ~Iis cho:i.ce to cora:.;:ly is conti~1g-ent 1won thr~ pe:rcei ved nee-
of lo' , ~ ·...,nese rewarus . 
i 
A normat.i ve :po~fer relationship involves both the usage of persuasion 
&"ild h1f1 uence · to fu::cthe:r a particular actiqn . "F ersuasive .. power is ex-
e:~~ci sed through the manipulation of symbols , such as appeals to . the value2. 
cL:.d !:-,e1:tim.ents of the c itizens, in order to mo 'bil.ize support and to .re11-
q 
a·lize those ".dho deviate ." This type of · persuasion is considered a : or2 
of po:-ra:r in that it lessens the rcs:i.stance to a pa.rticLJ..ar action. 
The use of ·i -r.-i'lu;:-nce does not .. rely on the threatened usage of sane-




cha.Ylge in the .:-1<:;_to~r~ ' ts prefei-.i::nce:.;. '1 lJ"~J~i}·:e 
_I .1.r1es l1i~J pr~3:ferences. 
Every concrete usage of power consists i.n ths usage of one or a 
u 
combination of these categories of power relationship. However, th2 pre-
dohinate use of one of these catagories of power will haY'3 effects upon 
t~1e stratification· or interdependence of those concrete structures of" 
int2raction. ~·tzio_1i _argues t-hat as the poJtrer rel:=.ttionsQips -become more 
cx::rci va a.--id le:ss normati va, hierarchic.aJ. patterns of orga."'lization are 
rr:o.re _prevalent • As these rel3.tionshi::ps become :n:.ors norrr,a.ti ve, the level 
o·; forrilal, social ranking will decrease and mobility ·:;·111 increas3 . 1 ~ 
Thus t if Etzioni is correct ia his observation, the :pr3vailing tyfa 
of pow3r rels.tionships wil::!. have an ef.::"sct upon V1e in'.~id.:mce of r:mt1,,.;.a.l 
dep;:mdencies.. 1-foiJ.e we are not in ,::.. position to f~l:r a.:.q_;ue this poi!":.t , 
tr1s a-reate:r Eis incidence of interdo:p.:mdencies. 
It i3 useful :Ln our 2.nalysis of structura1 :l.::1terc_;331errdence tq a..-i_.-~ 1 -
re:lational i.nt,2-rdependencies. 
·:rhe first factor wh.ich affects incidence of these rel ati,Jnal inter·· 
cl.epar1:.:'!.r~ncies is size. Taking the exai.-rn:ple of two. peo:ple who desire one 
reso:.:rce, the co1'-a~plsxity of the structur? is determined by the extent to 
~-;hich they a.ra mutually dependent . If the structure is hierarchical in 
1-:.--:-.turc; , t.ne po,-;e:r relationship is asynunetrica.l in that the flow of d•.:;-





0 c;::.tL1ot ;~;et :\ ~.:.o do -3 .. ti.yt~-:i:::-\g he woul-..1 not othsr.-rise d.o • 
.;: ·,·,,r,:-._:-~ relatio.:: s:nip is then considered unirlirectior1al ancl asyrnrrretrical . 
Ti::.U.3, the si~:_;>lic l. ty of the po:-rnr relatior..ship in this case is determined. 
oy the lack of mutual d.epe~1dancies. 
While. still considering the relationship betw~en -two people and 
0 1.1e r3source, relatively complex for:ns of mutuaJ. dependencies could be ,., 
dsscribed in the follo:-fing manner : 
(, ). \ l. 
n .LJ' i .,e ., B depends on -A for 
so~e resource,(A ~> 3) 
(2) A a.:nd. B mutually de:penc.er..t ~lpon one 2..:·10-c.hB~~ : ·o::c a resource 
coth 1:2 .. rties desire, L\ << ">> 3) 
(J) 3 :::~or.:inant ovs-r A~ (A << 3) 
are a.s i-: i.~ can say two in.ii viclu2c.l3 
Eo-;.,;ev-:::r, nors coEplex types of 
A2 a rule, wt'£l: the size i3 increased. tb.2 f~LL;1::e:r- of de_pend.,:3nci~3 3 
!-~~1 example· 9: this is found. ir.. a sirr1:pla hierarchy . 
A sir,I:lc hierarchy, ·or a 0 tree of dependence" occurs: 
if, and only i:, all elenents in the collection are directly or 
indirectly connec tad to -a simple s:..1.perordi:12.te elen:ent and. ele-
ments a.r;~J only ctirectly or indirectly connected. with each other 
tb.ro1..:.:sri a common superordinate element . 15 · 
L,J;I)orte uses the follo~,11.r.g illustration to demon3trate thi3 simple hier-
a.L'chy· wne~-~~ the dependence 9f elements- is upon one- s~p2:!:'ord.inate l" element. 
--- - - ------ 0 ~ _______ __. c.! 2 V 5
0· ------ ~ n J 1-.:;.____________ J '.J 6 
-------
----- (1 ' .J l~ 
action wh-::;re all !::.s::; oers. within the structure ar:-= !:1ut·.ally deperident. . 
ThL~ fbrm o:r r::.:ic·1 :::-,-roc'.."17 int2rdepend2Ece between all mem.l1ers is :lllus-
tratad iE the follo~dr!.6 
. ;7 
matrix : 
... . .... ., 
_L.:..t~~>.J_-.;si .J.~ .~:7. i 
••• -~ ·· •• · - - . .L. •• 
.. ,; i.• .... '. ~, } __ ) l.,...:::, i::1 
c,. J 
!...~ 
'II' • •• 
·~L 1.-: C (;.1~1:;() .r ~r C-2.:.L 
-.,_ 
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lz-:;a ole ir: c,,:,:-1c:cete str 1...:.ctu.res of hu::1an i:::'lteraction. This tyfe, the "sarai-
g 
.r!tt:W L118 .J': ; 
A collection of ele~ents forms a semi-lattice if, and. ot:.ly 
:singl '.:- .element i:i th·3 ·~ollection IEay be connected directly to any 
o+h.-:.··" <:-in;::rl.c, elr:,,;;::,r,t ar,-·1 .10 ·c·'iro-le element is .in a supe:::-ordinat\j r;r;~i~n-t~~ all ~:;t;er ~lcmsri~;·_-o,~ 
LaJ?'orte uses a figure similar to the following to . illustrate this typs of 
interdependence: 
intszaction allows for an ir.c:r·eas1:; i!;. the 1x1ssible m.1..~,:s :c of relational 
incid.Jncs o:· :rslatior:al interrie_pe:nd_f;llci2s. 
.... ::...-. 
I.J .l. the a, city c0.t.ri.1c:1l • T£· ..! ... L f co:.111.:.;l.l had. 
- .. , ' . 
CA s :.~--~~' ~· , i_~ ~; :_ -~ -;~ .. r., 
OI 
in tl-£ l)ol l tics c:f:' fina1cing hos1.Jit2.ls an.d is 3.ble to account :or the 
d.if.ficuJ.-:~L~:3 of go.Lng th.ro~h ·t/:.a :)olitical _p:::::oc.-23s. 
date -the low-3r inco~ne groups. The cthe:r meiilbers o: the council have or"ly 
and ........ '..,)' have some expert,ise l~1 t:1~ field. of hospi ta.l 
fin2.ricing a.nd politics, an.d the ot:1e:c nemcers of ti!3 cou::-:.cil a:-ce de_pand.ent 
:i_po:u. this '.~cowled.ge. Ho;-.,ev2r, r1.e:,~c:e:rs A, _-3, a~d. C 2,re all j_nterde:pen.ient 
b,3cause each deper:.ds on the other two :fer: a ce1. ~ain kr..o:dedgo 1-rhich he 
lg,cks. 
council to vote affirm2.t:i.vely on t::is issue i11 order t,:; i:mve the hoti_p:.tal 
built. 
clefii1ed .:~ c ...... .:.~_:.. the inci~ences of ttsse 
Eo~rev2:::-, if this co,mcil h2.d. to act upon ot:-,e:c is2ues--:;,J'--lblic housing, 
nw::erous. 
:f unc ti m'ls of the 
r.t~:1 
._.L!l· -~··.'. _ 1 ! J_~:: .r.·1 r.,t, t~ (' £.. 7~ ·~-I-.. ~-':·:;-~ i ... , "'r ·· ·. ·1"""1 --~ ···- ·i,-·,. ·-- ·.-. r·:! •• ·.- ..... e .. 1 ·~ ·- -~ '1 r""'' .,....__r"\ -- ........ • 






wa::, able to ns.vs a:i. impact upon the ~ecision made -cy the council.., He 1.s 
also the J~c..-i..i.6 er of a grocery store i::-.;. tha downtowr1 area. Wlt:~. the }",..11owl-
'iecisim:.:; on food stamps a.nd on urb2:~ 1:enewal . 
knowledge o.f so.rr.e of the aspects of tie effects of &~ expa.;:1sior: of t:ie 
food sta.G1p }Jrogram a.nd of the effects of urban renewal on the ousines3 
comrrn.111ity ir ..
l• r, ,.,. these 
the downtotm area, in:fluential fr tb:; 
., 'I. •• 
Cl.CClSl0:1S 
issue areas . is a.cti vely i:1.volve.J. ::..D. the 
·turr; anct hS,,f3 a 1ir~Ld .. ar iinp.:..1 .. ct o:r1 ·the l.3-e2is·ions I:-!ciCte by- tl~e colmci.l . 
?tli:.1~~ .. tional. z,.r;.:iu~:.d~=1-r1ce ·() (!C~s 
·- "'\ J ..... 
C'...\o ·-~ ..... -.:.:: to 
;1.cco:mt £'or fac-tors influc!lcing as_p:;cts o: hos_pital · constr:Jction, memb21: ? 
lappini; ·r:"\uctions in ~hat toth inm'.:'es.se the incidc:nc;s o: relational inter--
~'!hat I na.ve attem})ted to :point out ir. th::l.s sectibn a.:r.e the conceptual 
:::1oss"i 1Jiliti.:.s of com.9:exity/ sLr:plici ty o: coi.-:c:ret,9 s-t.ructu:r2s of in::er,,3,ction . 
ve l'JX'O't,/ 'Jc:at :i ve. 
are the fac t.c;-rs of 
A factor of ;.::oii1_plaxity- whicn·I have 
3 . :~·tificlal: and it 
'"\ ... .. 
\ ;EG1'ION T'.jiiQ: 
.ANALYTIC COMPLEXITY 
This discussion of the factors of analytic complexity 
will be separated into two parts. The first part will cover 
some of the more salient issues concerning the limitation of 
18 
the political ,analyst in perceiving, conceptualizing and · 
describing the complexity .of concrete structures of interaction. 
This discussion is important for the debate between pluralists 
and anti-pluralists .in that the latter has criticized the former 
for oversimplifing their methods of observing the political 
_process. 
The second part will briefly point out the differences 
in degree of complexity of the structures of analytic frameworks 
of the pluralists and anti-pluralists. 
LIMITATIONS OF ANALYTIC COMPLEXITY 
The complexity of political analyses is contingent upon 
the number and differentiation of variables and concepts 
used to describe the structures of political interaction 
.1 
and concrete behavior. The central issue to be developed 
here is the explication of the limitations which circumscribe 
the perceptions of the political observer~ While.the 
difficulty of separating the .,objective reality" which the 
observer perceives and the subjective preconceptions which 
skew these perceptions should be obvious, the intent of this 
explication of the limitations of the political observer is 
to demonstrate the ways in which these limi·tations simplify 
the diversities of the political process. 
~'1' 
d'-... 
Primarily, human deficiencies of observation and compre-
hamsability of perceptions limit the number of variables 
which can be analyzed by any one political observer. In his 
article, t"rhe Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some 
Limits on our Capacity for Processing Information••, George 
Miller posits the conclusion that human beings possess a 
rather small capacity for making absolute judgments 
concerning the differentiation of unidimensional sensations, 
3 . 
(e.g, differences in levels of pitch, etc.)~ By our nature, 
he argues, we use numerous devices to compensate for this 
human deficiency. Three of _the most important of these are: 
(a) to make relative rather than absolute judgments; 
or if that is not possible, (b) to increase the number 
of dimensions a.long which the stimuli can differ; or 
(c) to arrange the task in such a way.that we mak~~ 
sequence of several absolute judgments in a row. 0 1t11 .... 
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.Furthermore, Miller argues that we 0 recode 0 0 bits of 
information" into more "manageable chunks". Through this 
simpiification or symbolization process Miller argues that 
< z:; 
we are capable of dealing with complex perceptions. ---
DeTocqueville develops the notion of 0 general ideas" 
to explain how the hun1an mind can compensate for its 
perceptual inadequacies. The usage of general ideas allows 
the human mind to see similarities in diverse perceptions. 
which would otherwise be "lost in the wilderness of detail". 
Moreover, these general ideas- .. permit human minds to pass 
judgment quickly on a grea_t number of things; but the 
conceptions they convey are always incomplete and what is 
gained_ in extent is always 
. f'J·~ 
lost in inexactitude • n r"'!:t 
'l'hese 0 general ideas" are to be found in the common 
usage of' language. As Landau argues: 
All languages typify and categorize and we need no 
reminder that ordinary language does so in a crude, 
ambiguous, and often contradictory manner--and that_ 7 the observations it directs are of a similar character. 
If ordinary language is so "crude 0 and "ambiguous 0 , then it , 
is important that the political scientist sharpen ordinary 
language to make it more exact . But two basic problems 
occur in this sharpening process. The first is the problem 
of relevancy~ When a political scieniist develops concepts, 
they must be relevant to the concrete structures of inter-
action he is observing. The term, concept, is applied in 
this context to describe a set of characteristics cir 
,· 
attributes~ ~ The intension of the concept is delimited by 
its correct definition. The extension of the concept is 
20 
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is defined by the "class of all actual or existent things 
t!q 
which the term (i . e., concept ) correctly applies to or names." 
The methodology of a scientific inquiry is the way in which 
the intensive characteristics of concepts are organiged and 
applied to the observable concrete political structures of 
. . . • It 
interaction. The basic problem with the use of methodologies 
is the potential of incongruities between the conceptions 
used by the political observer and the characteristics of 
the observable phenomena. 
The second problem in the use of concepts is that they 
tend to become rigified. Because of the potential for 
incongruities, ( as noted above), it is important that the 
scientific observer not mistake the qualities of the concept 
for those observed. The scientific discipline is based upon 
flexibility and initiative, and it is dangerous, and often a 
ti 
source of distortion, when these qualities are lost . . Thus, 
as Landau points out: 
Care must be exercised that they (concepts) do not 
harden and rigidify--a danger that always results 
when we forget that an analytic construction is not 
a thing in a material sense. 13 
Landau· also points to the potential distorting effects 
of the use of metaphors in political science. He argues that 
metaphors are not only commonly used .in political discussion; 
they are essential: uwe could scarcely get along without 
., l'r . • . them . However, descriptive metaphors are a source of 
"distort.ion and misrepresentation.". For the perceptions of 
properties imposed. by the use of the metaphor may not have 
·,. any direct correlation with the percepti6n of the properties 
which the metaphor ismearit to describe. In short, the 
language used to describe perceptions of concrete behavior 
and events often structures the perception of the behaviors 
14 
and events, rather than the inverse. 
An example of the implicit use of metaphor can be found 
in pluralist utilization of the idea of a marketplace to 
describe how the political process functions. As in a 
marketplace, there are many different leaders (i.e., sellers 
· of wares) who both react to and pressure constituents, 
(i.e., consumers). Interest groups and individuals (i.e., 
buyers) come into the political decision-making process to 
use poli t.ical resources in order to receive goods and --
services, (i.e., commodities). The political decision-
making process, (i.e., the marketplace), is open to those 
who are willing to utilize their resources; however some 
individuals or groups only use their resources to directly 
specific issue areas which directly influence specific 
issue areas which directly affect themt ( i .-e., they only 
go to the marketplace on the days that there are specials 
on the comm6dities they wish to purchase). As in a market-
place, there are decisionst (i.e.; transactions) made, and 
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the method of analyzing who exerts power and/or influence 
involves the investigation of who makes decisions (transactions) 
a~d who benefits from these decisions, (e.g. the buyer· or 
the seller)~ Like commodities, issues only exist in ~he 
political arena when they have commanded the ''attention of a 
i .[, 
significant segment of the political stratum. u · --· Rather than 
extend this example,· we can see that the implicit use of' 
the marketplace metaphor has affected the pluralistst 
description of the political process . 
Metaphorical description should be used as an organi-
zational device to stimulate 0 a reorganization of thought 
that may be quite productive." In this way, the "metaphoric 
transfer--the substitution of analogy for actuality--may 
serve to reveal new attributes or disclose old ones in a 
tlo 
new light, thereby adding to the corpus of our knowledge. 0 
Many metaphors, however, become reified or rigidifie~ . 
In this case, the metaphoric transfer has taken effect and 
the metaphor is accepted as a literal descrption. 0 To take 
a metaphor literally", argues Landau, "is to create a-myth 
and the more conventional myths becomet the more difficult 
n 
they are to dislodge." -Thus. Landau is not arguing against 
the use of metaphorical descriptions; rather, he is arguing 
for the proper. ·usage df metaphors to represent that which 
has been deliberately conceptualized . 
We can now see that whether we call our generalized 
descrptions, "manageable chunks of information", "general 
ideas••, concepts, or metaphorical descriptions, an indeter-
minacy exists in the correlation between the observer's 
descriptions of his perceptions, the observer's actual 
perceptions~ arid the concrete behavior and events perceived. 
The importance of these distinctions amounts to·the increasing 
simplicity and decreasing precision as we f6llow the line 
from the 0 objective", and observable 0 reality" to the 
percentions of this ''reality'', and to ·the description of 
23 
2 ! , ~r 
these perceptions. In this way, both perceptual and descrip-
tive inadequacies limit both the number andtype of variables 
and concepts which can be analyzed by any one observer. 
However, this is not to say that analytic simplicity 
.should be maximized; rather, the acceptance of these 
limitations points to the indeterminacy of the correlation 
of our perceptions and descriptions of political phenomena. 
Thus, even though a · political process may be co'mplex, -we may 
not be able to perceive or to describe all or any of the 
complexities of th~t process. 
STRUCTURES OF POLI 1rICAL ANALYSIS 
While the relevance of the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm 
to the 0 science" of politics has been subject to serious 
debate, there appears to be little evidence with which to 
counter the hypothesis that various analytical frameworks are 
accepted by a part of or a majority of the community of 
political scientists. For our purposes, here, an analytic 
framework may be defined as an accepted theoretical · or 
empirical method v1hich is used to approach the study of 
various aspects of the political process, or of political 
analysis. 
While a complete investigation into the complexity of 
analytic frameworks is not possible within the constraints 
I 
of this essay, it ;will be tiseful for our analysis of 
pluralism to investigate how the structures of analytic 
frameworks differ in terms of complexity. 
rr~he complexity of the analytic framework is contingent 
upon the number of variables that fit into the conceptuali-
zation and (2) the openness to different types of observable 
phenomena. 
The complexity of the structure of' analytic frameworks 
is contingent upon (1) the number and differentiation of 
frameworks allowed within the confines of the academic 
community; (3) the relational interdependencies of frameworks, 
(e.g., the lack of any prevailing or predominate frameworlr 
and the presence of competing frameworks); {4) variability 
~ of frameworks over time to make them more relevant to existing 
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political knowledge. 
It is my contention that we can describe pluralist and 
anti-pluralist analyses as · two different structures of 
analytic frameworks. I will attempt to demonstrate that the 
structure of pluralist, analytic frameworks is simpler than 
that of the anti-pluralist, analytic frameworks. While any· 
one political theorist or scientist may utilize one or many 
analytic frameworks, the categorization of political 
theorists and scientists into.the categories ·of pluralist and 
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Underlying the structure of analytic frameworks utilized · 
by pluralists is a general concensus on hov, power and/or 
influence should be studied. I will attempt to point out 
this concensus by describing the methods used by Dahl, Polsby 
16 
and Banfield., 
The underlying asstunption taken by these three theorists 
is that the political analyst must study the actual exercise 
of' power and/or influence. By so doing, they attempted to 
make the distinction between potential and actual power. 
As Banfield states, "it is necessary to observe influence 
/1,j 
'at work' rather than 'in repose'. Dahl argues that the 
rW.tr\ 
"potential power a~ enjoys bears no necessary relationship 
:J..o 
to actual power he wields." 
To determine the 2.ctual power exerted by individuals 
-and groups, pluralists assume that the decision-making 
process must be analyzed~ _As Polsby contends: 
It is possible to distinguish three kinds of data with· 
respect to decision-making which.often serve as indices 
of the power of actors: one may ask (1) who participates 
in decision-making, (2) who gains and who loses from 
alternative possible outcomes, and (J) who prevails in 
decision-making.~' 
Or in the words of Dahl, community power must be studied by 
.X·~ 
a "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions." . ,:,,-
Because of the difficulty in analyzing the vast number 
of decisions made in the political process. pluralists- find 
it necessary to select "important decisions 0 • While Banfield 
and Dahl give us little criteria upon ~hich to base this 
"\. 
selection, Polsby is quite explicit) 
1. How· many people are affected by outcomes. 
2. How many different kinds of community resources 
are distributed by outcomes, 
J. How much in amount of resources are distributed 
by outcomes, 
4. How drastically present conL-ruunity resource 
distributions_ are altered by outcomes. ~3 
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Furthermore, the pluralists believe that it is necessary 
to uexamine a set of 'decisions' in different •.issue areas' 
in order to determine what kinds of people we-re the most 
9-'f 
influential. n 
From this brief outline of pluralist methodology, we can 
see there is little differentiation among analytic frameworks 
utilized by pluralists. Within the structure of pluralism, 
then, there is·a dominant analytic framework which has little 
variation over the time in which these books were written. 
For these· reasons we may say that the structure of' analytic 
frameworks is simple. 
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A!:n'I-PLURALISM: STRUC'I'URAL COMPLEXITY OF ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS 
The complexity of the structure of the anti-pluralists ' 
analytic framework, (~s opposed to that of the pluralists') 
may be seen as a result of the anti-pluralists' .· dissatisfaction 
.with the pluralists' emphasis on the examination of the 
decision-making process -1:o determine the extent · to which power 
is exercised in the political arena~ While anti-pluralists 
agree that a close evaluation of the decisions made is 
.m$rited, they see it as only "one face of power. 0 
Bachrach and Baratz, in their article, .,Two Faces of 
. 7 ;~ . . 
Power 0 , argue th~tjthe analytic framework of pluralism does 
not take into account the fact that political· power is often . 
used to narrow the scope of the decision-making process. As 
·we saw in the pluralists' analytic framework, the -exercise of 
political .power was examined by an investigation of th9 
decision-making process. As Bachrach and Baratz argue: 
Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies 
to creating or reinforcing social and political 
values and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public consideration 
of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous 
to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing thisi B 
is prevented for practical purposes, from bring to the 
fore any issues that might in their resolution be, 
seriously detrimental to A• s set of preferences. j-tp 
Thus, the anti-pluralists argue that by only examining 
the issues decided upon in the political process, the extent 
to which the political obser-ver can investigate the actual 
exercise of power ·is severely limited. 
However, does the study of' unon-issues 0 · , (i.e .• those 
which do not enter the decision-making process) affect the 
so ·-calJ.ed '' science .. of politics? Pluralists, such as Pols by 
"\., 
JO 
argue that the emphasis of political science on °non-events .. , 
rather than °policy-rnaking events•• presents "insuperable 
obstacles to research._ .. tfFor every event, · (no matter how 
def'ined) that occurs there must be an infinity of' alternatives. 0 
Polsby argues that as the number of 0 non-events11 makes 
research difficult, the necessary question emerges: .. which 
JB 
non-events are to be regarded as significant?u Who is to 
determine· the "real" importance of an issue ·which does not 
enter the political process? 
A wholly unsatisfactory answer would be:. certain 
non-events stipulated by outside observers without· 
reference to the desires or activities of communitv 
residents. ~q ~ 
However, Polsby does concede that a satisfactory answer to 
this question can be determined by examining a 0 signii'ica.rit 0 
number of citizen demands which were not acted upon in the 
~v political process. 
The structural complexity of the anti-pluralists' analytic 
frarnework is, in part, a result of the differing methods of 
examining the factor of non-decision-making. For our purposes, 
here, it is not possible to cover all of the ways in which 
the pluralists hav-e attempted to analyze the 'two faces of 
power 0 • Instead1 I will attempt to outline some of the more 
important ·ways. of analyzing the constraints of the political 
process lNhich have been utilized by anti-pluralists. 
One method of analyzing community power relations advanced 
by Crensen attempts to find a correlation b~tween "the neglect 
of' air pollution issues and characteristics of local :political 
~ i 
· leaders or institutions.If While he admits that any categorical 
~? 
statement concerning the importance of air pollution would. 
perforce be 0 value-laden .. , he attempts to determine the 
ltissue-ness bf air pollution by making a comparative study 
of 51 .American cities. By tabulating the results of a 
survey of ten community leaders--mayors. chamber of commerce 
presidents, etc.--from each city, he attempts to make 
statistical relationships "between the neglect of the air 
pollution issue and the political characteristics of local 
} d ., . t· . t· sa .ea. ers ana 1ns 1. -cu ions. 
Another method, used by Greenstone and Peterson in Race 
3:1 
and Authority in Urban ·Politics, involves a comparison of 
the implementation of the Community Action Program in.~five 
major cities--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia 
and Detroit. Through this comparative analysis they attempt 
to test some of the pluralist assumptions and conclusions and 
to study the ~plurality ·of forces that bear upon policy ,.q 
questions." Although the results of this important study 
of urban politics will be discussed in sectionthr~e, it is 
important to note that they include in their analytic 
frameworl-c such ·. ·variables as social role interests and 
associated ideologies, race relationships. regime interests 
and ideologies of' machine and reform politicians, social 
.n;representativeness of leaders"', relationship between 
bureaucratic efficiency and citizen participation, and 
../ 
consensual and coriflictual bargaining methods. 
3 ~) 
. . ?G:, 
In his account of Atlanta politics, Clarence Stone ~ 
attempts to show that there is a "system bias" which gives 
Jl 
certain groups a "positional advantage 0 in the political 
process. By studying the issue of urban renewal, over a 
20-year period, (1950-70) Stone directs his attention to 
the way in 'Which the political system converts ·citizen 
demands. rro do this, he investigates the less observable 
characteristics of concrete behavior such as the mobilization 
of popular support. official disposition on proposals, and 
the implemetitation stage. In this way, he attempts to 
demonstrate the constraints of the political system by 




Thus, we can see that there are a number o.f different 
methods of analyzing urban and cornmuni ty pmver :!'~elationshi:ps 
in the political process. The difficulty of examining the 
constraints of a particular political process has tended tq 
allow for competing analytic frameworks within the anti-
pluralist structure. :i.\'1oreover, many of the anti-pluralists 
make little attempt to refute the pluralist theory of politics, 
rather, for the most part they are in the process of altering 
and revising the pluralist theory to concur with thBir 
· empirical findings. Through this revisionist process anti-
pluralist:3 have added to the corpus of our knowledge of urban 
and community political processes. For these reasons we 
.can see that the structure of analytic frameworks utilized 
J2 
by anti-pluralists is .more complex than that used by pluralists. 
Howaver, it is important to notfthat (as was pointed 
out in the first part of this section) our methods of 
~nalyzing concrete structures of interaction are limiied 
by the inadequacies of our perceptual.capacities. By 
attempting to examine the less overt behavior of individuals 
and groups, our methods of investigation tend to envelop 
erroneous observations. As we will see in the following 
section, the different methodologies used by pluralists and 
anti-pluralists have resulted in differ~nt descriptions of 
the political process. Because of the indeterminacies 
involved in our methods of observation, it is important 
that we not completely discount either description of the 
political process. 
JJ 
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SPGTION TII: DESCRIPTIVE COI':IPLEXITY 
Public policy is formulated through bargaining and negotiation 
among a plurality of individual, groups, agencies , and 
interests. No single proposition in the literature on 
Ame~;can do~est~~ pol_icy fo~m:tion 1as been so convincingly argu~d, elaoorat~d, and documented. · 
In this section , I will examine some of the descriptions of 
ths concrete structures of political interaction made by descriptive 
pluralists and anti-pluralists. This distinction betwen descrintive .J.; . . 
pluralists and anti-pluralists should not be confused v.Ji th any 
:!:1ormative statements concerning the political process.. This is 
not to say that the descriptions of the political process made 
by pluralists and anti-pluralists are by any means "objective;" 
rathe·r, for · the purposes of this essay, an analyical distinction 
between descriptions and prescriptions · is helpful. Im~portant to 
note is that it is . not possible within the cotistraints of this 
paper to analyse all of the pluralists and anti-pluralists. As 
w-a.s done in the previous section, certain of these political 
scientists vrill be selected~ 
As noted at the outset of this esay , the descriptive 
pluralists and anti-pluralists will be discussed in terms of 
complexity . This is not to say that any political scientist or 
theorist describing politicai complexity is considered a pluralist, 
for this definition wciuld be so broad as to lose its specificity. 
J.5 
ff2SCTIIF'I'IVE GOI,IPLEXI'rY: PLURALISM 
This discussion of descriptive pluralists will center around 
-the v:orks of Dahl and Polsby. 2 ~vhile their descriptions o:f the 
political process are somewhat different, I will attempt t-o 
emphasize their similarities. 
By analysing the political process through an investigation 
bf the decision-ma.king process, the descriptive pluralists £'ind 
that the political stratum is open to any dissatisfied group . 
..:I\ s Dahl argues: 
The independence, penetrability, 2.nd heterogeneity of the 
various segments of the political stratum all but guarantee 
that any dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the 
political stratum, but to have a spokesman does.not insure 1 that the group's problems will be solved by political action~~ 
F'or the purposes of our discussion of' descriptive pluralists, I 
the reasons 
will attempt to outline/ why the pluralists make this contention. 
Pluralists assume that the actual power exercised ·by citizens 
in the political process bears no relationship with their 
actual power resources. This assumption is important to their 
conclusions in that they admit that there is considerable inequalities 
in the dit3tribution of economic resources within the corr1.--nuni ty. 
In examining the d2cision-makipg process, they find that the.· 
pol.i:tical stratum 1Has "dominated by many different sets of 
leaders, each having access to a different combination of 
"1~ political resources. In this way, resources tend to be dis-
tributed unequally, but "no one influence resource dominates all 
ths- others in all or even most key decisions .. 115 
Po~lEiby also argues that decision-makers are not an ingrovm 
elite; rathiar, he asserts that "there is a good deal of evidence . 
' \~. 
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that decision-makers become so by self-selection--p~shing them-
selves into the leadership group by showi!'lg interssts, willingness 
6 to ivork, and competence.,, Thus, we can see from the descriptions 
of the pluralists that th!E're are many different interest groups 
a:1.d -leaders within the political stratum. But, if we are to 
see the pluralist description of the political process asd 
complex, then, there must be interdepandsnce within ~~he structure. 
Polsby argues that the skillful political leader is adept 
J..n the -f-'processes of b:Ergaining, negotiation, salesmanship, and 
brokerage, and of leadership in mobilizing resources of all kinds." 7 
Thus, as Dahl 6bserves: 
The relationship between leaders and citizens in a pluralistic 
democracy is frequently reciprocal: leaders influence 
the decisions of constituents 1 but the decisions of leaders 
are also determined in part by what they think are, v.rilJ_ 
be, or hav~ been the preferences of their constitu~nts.8 
Dahl also argues, though, that not all of the citizens are involved 
in the political stratum. How are they to have any influence on 
attempts to answer 
the decisions of the leaders? Dahl/:cxxx~12X1.ts this question 
by making the distinction between dirsct and indirect influence. 
By direct influence, interest groups and individuals make 
demands, and political leaders respond to them. Indirect influence 
those 
is defined by the electoral po·wer of ci tizer..s who are and/who 
are not involved directly in interest-group politics. Since 
the political leader is mindful of his electoral interests, he 
will generally act in accordance with his perception of his 
electoral interests. 
Ove"1,..,lap_1."'_.;_in.c ... 2 _ m, p.·mberQhi·p~ of 2-"Y"_ 01 1 .... "'""'_ Q ; ~ ano+hcr ~,·ay ~ n hi· c 1 .i.. _ , - ~-' ~ ..._._~ ~- v\ .U>.J -'-0 -· vi..... {-I - .! . .._ \V.L n 
•.,. 
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individuals within the political strata are interd~pendent. As 
Dahl points ou.t: 
... the man who is a party politician in one role may, 
in another, be a member of a particular interest group, 
·social stratum, neighborhood, race, ethnic group, 
occupation, or profession.9 
In this way, the individual will have different types of dependencies. 
a political leader, he has to regard his electoral interests 
and coalitions of supporting interest groups. As a member of 
his neighborhood organization he may help to generate an issue 
to aid their interests in an issue area where we would not 
customarily have any interest. Thus, the overlapping memberships 
of groups tends to make the incidence of interdependencies 
within the politc~l strata more frequent. 
Perhaps most important for the pluralists, issues. resources, 
lsadership roles, interest-group coalitions, etc.t all vary over 
time. Thus, "pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, 
and i~sues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions 
among int!~rested groups and citizens ranging in thsir duration 
from momentary to semi-permanent." 10 
~~ccording to our definition of structural complexity, we can 
see that the pluralists describe the political process as complex~ 
in that there are many diffsrent individualst interest groups 
and leaders involved in the political process; the incidence 
of relational interdependencies are relativ~ly frequent; and 
all of these factors vary over time. In this way, vre can see 
that Dahl's conclusion is a description of political complexity: 
Neither the prevailing c onsensus , the creed, nor even 
the ~olitical system itself are immutable products of 
democratic ideas, beliefs, and institutions inherited 
£ram the past~ · For better or worse, they are always 
open, in some rn.e~.rnure, to alteration through those complex 
processes of symbiosis and change that constitute the 
relations of leaders and citizens in a pluralistic 
democracy.11 
DESCRIPTIVE SIMPLICITY : ANTI-PLURALISM 
Descriptive anti-pluralists vlill be analysed in terms of 
J8 
theii description of the simplicity of concrete structures of 
political interaction . I have used the term, descriptive simplicity, 
because of .their analytical emphasis upon the constraints in the 
political process. I do not mean to imply that either their 
.. d . . . . . ana.Lyses or escrip1;ions of the political structure is simplistic 
_ or unsophistoca ted; nor do I mean to imply that 1,ve may characterize 
their desciptions in any degree of absolute simplicity. 
Anti-pluralists have attempted to modify, revise, and 
s·ometi:mes to refute the pluralists ' descriptions of political 
complexity. They tend to reject the notion that the political 
process is completely open to interest groups, and argue that 
variou~ factors within the political structure act to limit the 
effectiveness of interest-group participation. 
Crensen argues that the political system has consistently 
narrowed the scope of decision-making and has neglected the 
"real " importance of the air-pollution issue. j\Jhile · the decision-
making process appears to be disjointed , Crenssn contends that 
"there is a general bias or direction in this disjointedness . 
Decis i onmak.ing is channeled and restricted by the process of 
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• • k • H 12 non-deC1~:1ionma ing. 
As notGd in section tvrn, the pluralists' analytic framevwrk 
dicl not examine the poli tica1 "non-issue . .u ~or a·ccor~1·~u to .... -, .·~""'- ... .1.0. 
tJ:;.e pluralists, the rs are no objective criteria by vvhich to 
an issue which does not reach the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, since they found that 
the biases of decision-making were non-cumulative and crosscutting, 
they considered the political process to be relatively fair. 
l\l though Eirensen' s methods of judging the importance of the 
air-pollution "issue" are somewhat questionable, the significance 
of his study is to point out that there are politic~l de6ands 
·which are not incorporated into the political arena. 
In his analysis of the urban renewal program in Atlanta, · 
Clarance Stone argues that the political system is 0 biased.0 He 
defines the term in the following manner: 
1ro the degree that system characteristics work consistently 
to favor the selection:of top level officials with predilections 
to facilitate actions on some nolicv measures and impede _ 
actions on others, then the system ~ay be said to be.biased. 1] 
By this definition, Stone directly counters the pluralist 
· conception of non-cu.mulative and crosscutting biases. "~3ys tern 
bias directs attention to the role that public officials play in 
advancing some interests at the expense of other no less active 
and directly aff~cted interests. 
1\n aspect of the palitical procsss which Stone directs his 
c~ ttention to is the vmy .in which social demands are converted 
into political issues. Political success in the conversion process, 
1 • , d t II h ~ t•· 1 l..L" ·1· . ~ .tie argues, is o.epen en· upon su;.,s i.,an ia ,· mu.,_ t..lp ___ e, . ana expendable 
" ~ ,, . . .. ·1L~ . :r"2~Jources ano: upon .ravorable CJ.rcumstances." Since the -2--rouns .._,, ..... 
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. impporting urban renewal had these resources and had the favorable 
circum3tance of gaining official support for their poisitio~. 
the seemingly disjointed, incrernsntal approach to planning in 
ths 
l\ tlanta consistently favored t~n.e renewal issue over/neighborhood 
renewal issue. 
According to the .. revisionist" theory advocated by Stone, 
officeholders are not the neutral arbiters of interest groups 
that the pluralists described; rather, they are likely to be 
advocates of some group interests. 
In Stone's case study, the officials promoted the urban 
renewal project even when the so8ial dislotations caused by the 
·oro iect ~ave rise .to black protests. Rather than elaborate J:: V ..__, 
on Stone's case study, it is important to note that both Crensen 
and stone attempt to examine the nopennsssu of political structures 
to various "issues." Through their descriptions of the manifest 
constraints of the political structure, they have argued that 
the political arena is not a neutTal bargaining ground for interest 
groups ; rather, the political structure systematically limits 
the scope of decision-making to hinder, (if not prohi~it), 
many different issues from emerging as rtpolitical issues.u 
In their wide ranging political analysis of the implementation 
of the Comm1 . mity Action Program, Greenstone and Peterson attemot . . 
. ~ 
to examine and to modify the d ·2 scripti ve complexity of· the . 
proce S~3 advocated by the pluralists. ;~'lhile it is beyond 
the scope of tlis esay to point out all of the various ways in 
\·ih ich they hav0 analysed and have described the constraints of 
the political structures in five major American cities, it will 
'\. 
L~l 
be useful to describe some of the more salient factors of 
political constraints . 
Greenstone and Peterson argue ~gainst against the direct 
1 . ' . f ti,.. p a:8p ica--cion o:.. .LL .... electoral interest model promulgated by the 
pluralists~5 As we saw in the first part of this sectiont the 
1 1 . 1- n i:-, 1 t· · ., · · · 1 1 ~ r 11 t i_. n_-:p . ura is-bs argv.e._._ ·l,na·c ne pOJ..l "tJ_ca eacer gene .a-. y ac . s _ 
accordance with his perception of his electoral interest. Green-
stone and Peterson argue that thsre are several problems with this 
model. First, the political leader may not know v1hat will or 
what will not affect his constituents' vote. It is always 
problematical to attempt to determine why someone acts in the 
way_ that they do; it is sometimes difficulty or impossible to 
determine vvhy individuals vote in a specific way. 
Second J they advance the theory of individual ideologiris ·which 
effect the "action-orientation" of the political leader. · Although 
Greenstone 2.ncl Peterson's categorization of ideologies has grave 
problems in ascertainihg the reason why a leader (or mayor) acted 
. t . ·t . . t t +- • in acer ain way, i, is an irnpor .an avtem.pt to explain a reason 
·.vby leaders do not act according to electoral interests. 
Another feature analyzed by Greenstone and Peterson the 
e ffect of the role of autonon101..!s bureaucrad.2s upon the poli tica.l 
system, and specifically upon the participating in the Community 
Action Program. Although they do not argue that every city 
ha~~; autonomous bureaucracies, they use an organic metaphor to 
Con tend that, '' the . more au tono-;n_,_._011_'.-=! a,,.., o..,.,.. rr-r~·n-; zat ~ on ..)....h,::i 1no.,..o. - __ ...., J..1 ... t:,O...!.-~_ •J. ' _t.,_ '--' . ~· - J.'v 
important is a mission for its survival. 0 i 6 In addition. to, and 
so~e time 3 a part of, . the ors ai za tional · "need'1 for survival, is the 
.... 
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,... '"t /_ ., d c, t·· ·oerformance or 1 ~ ... 1,Dre scrioe Iunc ion. ~ . ~ . . . In the case of the 
autonomous bureacracy, its primary function is th~ rationalization 
of decision-making. 
HmAfever, as Greenstone and Peterson point out, "rationalit,y 
:::ind span tane i t~r are inherently in tension with each other. 1 7 · 
The tension between rationality and spontaneity in politic~ points 
concrete application o.f the theory of 
to two basic critic isms of/pluralism. The first criticism v1hich 
Greenstone and Peterson advance is that the autonomous bureaucracies 
tend to maximize "efficient" methods of governing at the expense 
of minimizing the importance of participation of individuals and 
groups in the process of government. 
The s.econd criticism, which is derived from tt.e first, attacks 
o.f partic.ipa tory pluralisrn 
one of ths advantr::.ges/which has been argued by prescriptive 
.pluralists. :.:fhile this 'Nill be covered in the following section. 
it is is helpful to not here, that one of the prescribed advantages 
o.f pluralism is that it allows for individuals and groups to feel 
as though they are a part of tl1e governin~ process, and that 
J)articipation in groups is ess.ential for the educationaI--devel-
opment of citizens. the governmental policies are planned 
and carried out through autonomous bureaucracies, then this an 
argument that can be ma.de by descriptive anti-pluralists who 
are also pres6riptive pluralists. 
~.1•4 rorr.,.·1 .j..,,_,,_ii_ , __ "•• c .. -.'. ar,_.-=.tl.,y~~ -1· c::: 0.L.eo ,,::: 0. -J.n. ,n... 1"I"' t 1" 0 de,....., r-~r-1 D --1-l· V 0 an·f-: 1· · D,.LU r•a 1 1· ~ -1.. ... _ _ • • ~ - .._, ._, . - ,.J .l..L1,., ..l -~ ;:;:i .__,_ .J....i t, v · -~ . .> . - l . c:l...J.. Q (.,b 
v.re can c:.lse that their ernpha:Jis on the constraints of the governmental 
nrocess is a way of describing the simplicity of this process. 
F'or the mobilization o_f biaf;3,or system bias, disallows-·various ~·· •· < 
issuef,and groups f'rom gaining substantive access to the political 
4J 
arena. The effect of ideological orientations of political lead~rs 
may decrease the interdependency between the politicians and 
their constituents. The effect of the raticinalization of 
r:·overnmental policy by autonomous bureaucraciss decreases the 
dapsnd.ence of the bureaucracy upori partisan politics and upon 
citizen participation. The bias of the system, the positional 
and 
advantage of particular groups,/the rationalization of politics 
may all be .factors in decreasing the variability of the political 
process over time. Thus, for these reasons we have used the 
notion of descriptive simplicity to analyse the emphasis of 
the anti-pluralists' statements about how the political process 
fLmctions. 
:3ECT ION FOUR.: · PRES GR IPI1 IVE C CICPLEX ITY 
In this section I will attempt to demonstrate some bf the 
reasons why prescriptive pluralists view the conception of political 
complexity as a normative principle to be mtl.ximized.. I will·also 
"~h . , . t" attempt to cover some or l;J. e reasons vmy pre scrip ·ive anti-pluralists 
have rejected the application of political complexity in American 
government. Hers again, the constr2 .. ints of this essay do not 
allow an extended exploration into these opposed viev,points. 
It is important to draw a distinction between descriptive 
· and prescriptive pluralists and anti-pluralists. .As shmvn in the 
previous section , descriptive anti~~pluralists have attempted to 
modify, revise and sometimes to refute the descriptive pluralists • 
statements concerning the nature of political complexity~ 
Prescriptive anti-pluralists, on the other handt believe that 
tbe'.,annlication of pluralism in government has undesirable results . 
.;..,,. th0 cen··'-rpl 1·ct 0 a bohi·n.--1 .,. ....... _, ... - l, ......... A,.,-. - - c;. ( ~· .._ ... .:.. .... 'L...,i.. 
In short,/the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
anti-pluralists is. the difference betwaen the "isn and the 
'\ought" statements. On the one hand, the descriptive anti-
pluralists believe that pluralism does not vrnrk, and on the 
other, that it should not be a:pplied. to government. 
Descriptive pluralists can al~o be prescriptive anti-pluralists, 
in that they view pluralistic democracy as political complexity, 
but do not believe that pluralistic complexity is desirable. 
'1:he invers1:; also applies to som·s political scientists who B.re 
descriptive anti-plutalists and prescriptive pluralists. 
However, for the purposes of this essay, and for the sake O f' ..... 
C-lcr' . .1."'.,..l
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p l-u.ralists and anti-pluralists. 
J~R1iSCRIPT IV3 PLTJR1-\LI3T3. 
Prescriptive pluralists are those who view the pluralistic 
conception of political complexity as .an ideal or as a normative 
principle, For the purposes of this analysis, I will cover 
three major reasons why th2 principle of pluralistic _complexity 
should be furthered: (1) promotion of tolerance, (2) provision 
of neutral means of govermnent, (.3) socialization of' citizenry 
through small groups. 
The first contention of prescriptive pluralists is that 
the complexities of the politice.l process promote tolerance in 
society and in goverrnnent. .Because of the multiple centers of' 
power, no one group is able to gain hegemony~ and thereby abl e 
to assert its interests and values upon others; rather, each 
group must respect. the preferences of the other. Groups :which 
are highly interdependent must respect the needs and desires .of 
others and must allow for differences of opinion advanced by 
the other g roups. 
Moreover, since tha interest groups which govern are based 
Llpon a · subje etivs conception of interest, ~ no objective 
criteria can determine categorically that one group is wrong 
in its cons.i d.era tion of its O'v\lT1 interest. . The only exception 
to this would be when one grou11 ·.vante.d more tha11. its "share" of 
the goods and services. But even this exception h~s a ring of 
lty•c la· -1--j 'f "T ..Ll,"iT 11 abOl J. t i + • ·- c; \JJ_ _ ,J • l _ ~ VJ for one group's" share'' can only be 
d.eterrnin2d in relation to the "share"of another group.. 1rhus, 
J+6 
,· 
the chiche, "everything is relative," has significance in this 
conte·xt, because of the lack of any objective criterion to judge 
H':Jsolutss . 
The_ second argument nade by prescriptive pluralists is that 
t:1s pluralist system of government is a umorally neutral means 
1 
for pursuing political. ends. 11 ..1. In this view, 11 each .i..ndi vidual 
plays a sigi1ificant, and not simply · sy:nbolic role, in the political 
? 
px·ocess of decision.".... If the access to the polit-.li.cal arena is 
virtually guaranteed to all groups, each groups will have the 
opportunity to play a part in making the laws to which everyone 
will obey~ . The process is not perfect in that not all laws 
made by this process will be good ones, but the process is 
a way of allowing people to gover~ themselves. 
Perhaps Alexis de 1I1ocqueville can be seen as the most important 
proponent of"' this idea . of sustaining popular control over the 
goverrunental process. He- argues that Americans. absorbed in the 
intricacies of their private affairs, often see little need 
for participation in public affairs. ~'.lhen the individual is 
asked to participate he assum1-=:.s that the function. of government 
is to "allow them to· acquire the things they ·.covet and will 
not debar th2rn fro:n the peaceful enjoyment of those possessions 
,.., 
which they have already acquired. ".J 
Often the individual believes that the strength of popular 
control over democratic institutions can be sustained without 
his effort. But as De Tocqu~ville points out, the predominance 
of such a belief will result in the control o:f government by the 
fsw over the many. The inattentive citizens fail to see that a 
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f ::: v.r "regulate everything by their ow:'1. caprice ... 
Thust this failure to attend to the common welfare results 
in the despotic rule of a few. In this way, the individual 
neglects to see that his failure to exercise effort in public 
cLi'fairs will eventually rob him of any semblance of conscious 
control over his ovm affairs. Even his though. can be manipulated 
ty public opinion when he exclusively £allows his narrow perception 
of his self-interest. 
De Tocqueville sees that the political efficacy of the 
individual must be strengtherled. Two basic means to this end 
are possible: (1) by giving the individual responsibility 
over public affairs and (2) by encouraging participation in 
political and civil associations. 
First, by entrusting the self-interested individual with 
the administration of minor political affairs, his knovrledge 
0£ the inter-relationship between nis private interests and the 
common weli ... are increas~s. As his knowledge increases, so will 
his interest in.public affairs. J;~ s he gains confidence of his 
political control over these small mattets he will be convinced 
of his political efficacy. This will carry over to his ~onfidence 
in associating with others for political goals. 
Second, as the society becomes more complex, the individual 
must act in conjunction with others in associ~tions to gain 
p olitical efficacy. Although it is difficult to draw men out 
of their na~row circle of interests, Tocqueville states th~ 
·i m·o >"r+anr· ,::i Of' ., ... t,:.Lj•,; {_ \,/ ~ ,_,,, . .;. citizen avv_are of h 1 c._< relr-J -!-·t (Yy1n}) i··•o .L ... -u _ CA. ~J- ..J ... , 0.t .... ).; 
·.,d. th the :part of society that he doc~s not normally see. 
48 
What are the pluralistic elements in Tocqueville's treatise? 
First, he emphasizes that the isolated individual, consumed vrith 
b •..1...• :::ir'1 i 1.,1on for particularistic,economic gain, is politically power-
less and that the individual is merely mistaken to believe 
that he can live apart from the community in which he resides. 
8 -:3cond, he states the normative argument for popular control 
over government so that the few will not ruLe instead of the 
many. Third, his emphasis on the need f'or group action, instead 
of individual action, is particularly important for interest-
considsred 
~ioup pluralism·. For groups are/the motive force in pluralistic 
/J, 
g overnment. · 
'The third argument utilized by prescriptive pluralists concerns 
the tocialization of citizenry through small groups. In this 
the face-to-face relationshins of 
view, they contend tha t/small groups enable the member of' that 
g roups to develop personality and promote loyalty to the state. 
As Wolff points out: 
In a large society, loyalty to the state must be built 
upon loyalty to a multiplicity of intra-social groups _ 
in which men can find the face-to-face contacts which 
sustain their personaliti~s and reinforce their value-
attitudes.s ·~ . 
mr~mbership · in 
~~hrough/small groups the citizen may find a meaningful existence 
am.id th2 complexities of modern society. 
Thus, the theory of pluralism can be seen •as a bene.ficient 
way of g overning society according to a philosophy of equality 
and justice. 
\ ., 
:t?RSSCR IPr.r IV.E~ t1I'·T'rI-PLUR:.\ LISTS 
In this discussion of the prescriptive anti-pluralists I will 
attempt to point out some of the criticisms of the three principles 
of pluralistic complexity advocated by the prescriptive pluralists: 
f 1 ) ·tends -i...n eY'l.r:-o-·rcP- 0 0-nfo'V'>r('\; .J..u \ J.. ·- _ .• U V 1. J..l. . . _. V .1. • .l.. J.ll ..i... l_, .J ' (2) to disciiminate in favor 
o.f elites, and ( J ) to sliminat2 public values from political 
C··onsi· c:, 0 Y'a~--j 0Y'I 
6 
, _ .I , . .lv- .._ L,_,__ :..J. • 
First, the concrete applic~tion of pluralism tends to enforce 
:~onformi ty to the interests of established groups . ~-folff"' argues 
that this conformity creates "a strange mixture of the greatest 
tolerance for v1hat 'Ne might call established groups and an 
equally great intolerance for the deviaftt individual''.? While 
;this principle of intolerance for private individual di~ferences 
is contrary to traditional liberalism ; it is supported by the 
:1rgument that "i t is good for each individual to conform to 
C! om'.:). c, oc i ~ l c:-rr.-.·ur. " 8 '"'·;., J.t .. '-' o -..:..J .. ....._ t.:J '-., .1.J • 
Hm·,ever, this ty.92 of intolsrance for individual differences 
tends to stifle initiative for change both within the group 
itself, and consequently, within the governmental structure. 
T._, r_.- ct'.o_,,1.n ... 0 11 :;:1_.r,-;:,.11.e~_, t:_.hj __ a-t-J , 7 0-11;-y)+:::i,'i,.. ~ "~'°'or. i a+i o,..--.c• ann nrJ· va..:...,.._ - ,.....y> ,0 1 1n° ...,.. . .1. '-' ci v ~ - - _ v ~ , . .!..1 u,._..,,_ ... t.Y .__u ,.:J ~ __ ,.,_.&,_ ... J..·..:l ~ - l. . . t,c z,- · ..... !..i- l::, 
tend to have explicit guidelines for membership and to have 
limited purposes. Because of these explicit guidelines for 
~embership, the groups tends to have an homogeneous constituency. 
Ahen these groups are in competition with each oth~r~ as they are 
in pluralistic democracy s they tsn.d to eru:orce 1J.nanimi ty upon 
their mer:-i"ber:3. l\ s I;'fcC onnell points out: 
\ 
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Strong distaste for anything less than unanimity seems to be 
one of the principal characteristics of private associations. 
Perhaps the most common response tc» disagreement when it 
does appear is to attempt to suppress it, either by appeals 
.for unity or by more drastic means9 
However , one of the most salient aspects of private associations 
:1.s their voluntary nature: an individual has the choice whether 
or not to join. If pluralism is to be based upon the Voluntary 
a3sociationsg then it is important that the individual member 
has some conscious control over the group. If the individual 
does not have this control , how can pluralistic politibs be any-
thing more than congeries of <lecentralized oligarchies with the 
leaders of these "private groupsn controlling its members. 10 
McConnell argues that if the Michelian "iron law 01"' oligarchy" 
:.s applicable to· the organization of private groups, thsn these 
groups can hardly be seen as the context in which citizens are 
capable of determining their own interests. ~vhile; he finds 
that the Michelian thesis is not overwhelmingly applicable to 
private groups , the important aspect of the nature of these 
groups is that the member has few means by which to combat the 
t' 
power exerted by oligarcllic leadership. His one recourse is to 
resign. rrhis option o_f resignation is what McConnell argues 
iEJ one mf the differences be tvmen group membership and national 
citizenship. As he points out: 
Resignation is the individual's ultimate recourse and the 
element that finally distinguishes the private association 
from the public body.11 
the 
Thus, we c.an see: that/conformity of the individual to the interests 
of' the grOUJ) is prevalent in the organiz::1.tion t)f interE:st-groups. 
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j·e can now see that intolerance for individual diffenmces 
\lithin groups is limited by the structure of the group.. Limitations 
of the principle of tolerance, however, do not stop here. According 
to the theory of pluralism, no group can legitimately be left 
ou t of the bargaining process. If the political system does 
not allow certain groups, (eg., migrant workers), from entering 
the political arena, then the· pluralist principles of equality 
justice must be questioned. If these principles are not 
questioned , the political arena has illegitimate. admission policy 
1..,rhich di.fferentiates betvreen grov.ps. 
In this case, the limited admission illegitimately denigr~tes 
certain groups and viewpoints. Henry Karie1 has convincingly 
?,rgued that the government acts as a pluralist referee who 
"nystematically favors the interests of the stronger against the 
weaker party in interest-group conflicts. 012 The"referee•; then 
acts to consolidate the power of the stronger groups at the 
t( ,\ expense of the weaker ones. In this way, legitimate, b~t 
brganizationally weake r, interests are suppressed and defeated 
in the pluralistic "democracy. " . ~folff malrns· the analogy of' the 
urnpir8 in a baseball game to demonstrate this function: 
It is as though an umpire W9re to come upon a baseball 
game in progress be tween biE, boys and li ttl.e boys, in which 
the big boys cheated, broke th~ rules, claimed hita that 
were out:3 ~ and made the li ttls ·boys accept the injustice 
by brute force. If the umpire undertakes to "regulate" 
the p·nrnc:i by r:::im·ol y- i0nfo-rcin.o- the "ru.1°,::- 11 actua] lv b.ainu - <.::>: ............ _, "· ' ·1 ........ - J.. -, - -~ t -: .•• .':".:..' .;.!,\...,, . . .. , -....,...,_;, . . - ·u. ~ -.!.o pract:Lced, 11e do'.3s no-c ::chereby make -che game a fair one. 
Indeed, hs may actually make matters worse, because if 
the little boys 5et up thsir courage, band together, and 
decide to fight it :out , the um~oire will accuse them of 
,o·rp:·ikin--:r t}-1c:i rulr.i.c, a-·nn t-i--,..,...0'" 1..,-:;,-. 1,,,rei;-.. ·.,.·,.'n:'-r., ar)'ai·nst -4--hc~"".t 1..J') - ............. ... a~-- O - " - · -'-'-...:..:, ... -~ ~J...J_ i; l' J.J....!.. ·.;:> , --- ""~) . ·.t V ~in .. 
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'rl1e third cri tici~m of the application of the theory of 
, 
plural~sm to political structures is that it defends a narrow 
conce.p ti on of ra ti 0~1.al i t,y. "Concrete demands are held to be 
. 1 . , 1 d ., . -'- . · 1 "ll~ rationa, wnereas genera .emanas are 1rra~1ona. 1\ny notion 
of a 0 public interest" is seen as a ploy ussd to defend the 
narrow interests of an interest group.15 If there is no accepted 
conception of ~"!Jhe public interest by vrhich to limit the demands 
of private interests, then there can be no format check upon 
the concrete demands of interest groups. If the nature of 
politics is to construe limitations on the legitimate function 
of government, then the limitations of government will be determined 
by, and in the interests of, dominant interest groups. 
The governmsnt cannot be formal or distinct "when it is 
bvoken into units corresponding to the interests which have 
l .-1 • If 
1 6 T .... 'h . , 1 . . . t . . , 1 1 deve_ope0. power. -· ~I -c .. e puo ic in-teres s is a viao e goa 
to be e.ttainsd, it must be· accrued at the expense of interest 
,groups which control the governmental process. 
BcConnell argues that public interests ; can only result 
from national constituencies. Governmsntal responsibility 
to public interests can only exist when these interests are 
.knovm. andl. a.re pursued by large hetereogenous constituencies. 
"The mean:i.ng of responsibility is empty, unless the constituency 
to which respons.ib.ility is mved and actually paid is known, ,,l? 
:::1.11.cl is not ob;::;cured by narrovrly constituted interest groups. 
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In this essay I have attempted to demonstr2te how the theory 
o-f' pluralism can be viewed both as a description of , and as a 
:prs~;;cription for J)Olitical complexity. dhile the notinn of 
complexity can entail many different ideas, I have attempt·~d 
to primarily use this notion to describe hbw a plurali~tic 
democracy is a complex process. 
Athough the topic I have chased to discuis is extre~ely wide-
is helpful in understan~ing pluralism a , ... .:::, 
a -form of :poli·tical corr.plexi ty. Perhaps useful in concluding 
this essay vdll be a summary of the basic points _ I have attempted 
to make in the four sections . 
In the first section, I attempted t6 point out the conceptual 
possibili tics of the notion of complexity and to question s.ome 
the views of rigidity which have been implied ~vith some 
the theories of complexity. 
The second section explored some of the limitations of 
J}::3rceivin.g, dsscribing and conceptualizing complexities. In 
this bontext, I attempted to differentiate the pluralist and 
anti--:pluraliE.it analytic framevrnrks by examining their msthodologies 
with which they have analysed the political process. 
The third section dealt with the des6riptions of the political 
process. By using a simple anilytic frameworkt the pluralists 
d.e r3 (;ribed ths political system a,s complex._ The anti-plu::-alists, 
on the other hand, u3ed a relatively more com1)lex. analytic 
.:i:'ra~nework and described a relatively less complex political 
system th~n the pluralists . 
The fourth section ::1.tt=-.;mptt:d to point out some of the 
,J .Lfferences between the normative vie-·/-rco.ints of' :pluralists and 
anti-pluralic:its. 
By taking such a broad approach to the theory of pluralism 
T had hoped to.view this theory .as a whole. But such a holistic 
a~proach is not possible within tha given limitations of this 
analysis. However, in understanding a theory of politics I 
believe it is important that we look not merely at the analytic 
framework of the theory, or at the extention of the theory in 
d~scribing political events, or at the prescriptions for the 
political process; rather, we should attempt to l6ok it a broader 
IJicture in the hope of understanding both the complexity of the 
tpeory and that of the concrete behavior and events which tha 
theory attempts to explain. 
Unfortunately, the constraints of time and energy have limited 
extent to which many of the ideas could be covered in this 
e-fJsay. The correla. tion I have atti2m:pted to make concerns the 
con.c2ptual possibil iti2 s of cori1plexity, the human limitations: 
of perceiving and describing concrete structures of interaction, 
the analytic limitations of structures of political inquiry, and 
the o.f a particu.lar 
ty:)e of inquiry. Jhils it is difficult £or me to judge the 
success of this essay in making th~s cofrelation, I would_like 
to conclude with a quote from C. :1righ t I.Tills: 
I can talrn a small portion of this ver·y 1arge topi.c and 
try to prove something about it in some detail; or I can 
i-'1.}· 0 '1-r)q 1-i·1ole to.,) i 1~ and. t·----y to be me r,:.ily provocative.· r:J;_-t~r;ii/ ~I chaos~ ·-the--~e;;nd ~ours~:-· f~r one thing, it 
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